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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
ROBERT B. HANSEN, 
Appellant, 
-v-
MORONI L. JENSEN, 
President, Utah State 
Senate; UTAH BOARD OF 
REGENTS and UTAH 
STATE UNIVERSITY, 
Respondents. 
CASE NO. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT, ATTORNEY GENERAL 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal by appellant from an Order of the Third 
Judicial District Court, denying appellant's Motion for Swrmary 
Judgment and granting respondents' Motions for Swrmary Judgment, 
thereby holding Senate Bill No. 201 (Chapter 114, Laws of Utah 1977), 
constitutional and valid. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the Order of the Third Judicial 
District Court which would then render Senate Bill 201 (Chapter 114. 
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Laws of Utah 1977), in violation of Article VI, Section 22 of the 
Utah Constitution and the Utah Senate's "Consent Calendar" procedure 
unconstitutional. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts in this matter are not in dispute. Appellant 
and respondents have entered into a stipulated statement of facts 
which is contained in the record on appeal. Appellant does not intend 
to rely upon the Transcript of Proceedings before the Third Judicial 
District Court, pursuant to Rule 75 (a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro· 
cedure. The notice requirements and other procedural matters are not 
in question in this appeal. 
The issues presented center around the utilization of a "Con-
sent Calendar" procedure adopted by the Utah State Senate on February 
21, 1977. Copies of the written Consent Calendar procedure appear as 
Exhibit (A) and Exhibit (B) to the stipulated statement of facts. A 
copy is also attached as Exhibit (A) to appellant's (plaintiff's) Cornplai~tl 
The Consent Calendar procedure utilized by the Utah Senate pro· 
vides that a bill or resolution may be considered for passage upon a fin~· 
ing that: 
(1) A quorum is present, 
(2) Those favoring passage when called for by the 
President of the Senate respond collectively 
with a "yea" vote; and 
(3) When called for if a single "nay" vote is voiced at 
that time, then a full roll call vote is taken. 
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All senators present are presumed to have voted and voted affirma-
tively. It is recorded in the Senate Journal as all present having 
voted and voted "yea." Those senators not present are listed as absent. 
No provision is made for an abstention vote. Bills on the Consent 
Calendar may not be debated or amended on the floor but may only be re-
ferred back to a standing committee on a majority vote. 
Appellant takes no issue with the Consent Calendar procedure, 
except on final passage. Whether the Consent Calendar requires a three-
day waiting period, or applies to a first and second reading, or com-
mittee assignments, is irrelevant to this appeal. 
Senate Bill 201 (Chapter 114, Laws of Utah 1977), was adopted 
on final passage by the Consent Calendar procedure utilized by the Utah 
Senate. The 1977 Senate Journal for day No. 46, at page 592, lists only 
the fo 11 owing : 
"S.B. No. 201 UTAH STATE FIELDHOUSE BONDS was read 
the third time and placed on its final passage. 
S.B. No. 201 was approved by unanimous voice vote 
of all Senators present. (Senator Peterson absent) 
S.B. No. 201 was transmitted to the House." 
The senators present are not separately listed as voting in favor of 
S.B. 201. Nothing else is listed in the Senate Journal regarding the final 
passage of S.B. 201. 
Senate Bill 201 authorizes, among other things, the issuance 
-3-
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of revenue bonds for the remodeling of the existing fieldhouse at 
Utah State University. All parties to this action have requested 
advance placement on the calendar of the Third Judicial District 
Court, and this Court as remodeling of the fieldhouse has already 
conmenced. A final and expeditious resolution of the issues pre-
sented herein will enable bond counsel and administrators to make 
appropriate decisions regarding continued construction, once the 
constitutional questions have been answered. The Utah Senate passed 
127 other bills and resolutions in the 1977 General Session, utilizing 
its Consent Calendar procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ARTICLE VI, SECTION 22, OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION, 
REQUIRES A "YEA" AND "NAY" VOTE UPON FINAL PASSAGE 
OF ALL BILLS, AND, THEREFORE, THE "CONSENT PROCEDURE" 
FOLLOWED BY THE UTAH SENATE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. 
Article VI, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution, requires, 
among other things, that: 
11
.. • The vote upon the fi na 1 passage of a 11 bi 11 s 
shall-be by yeas and nays and entered upon the respective journals of the house in which the vote occurs. 11 
The Senate Journal shows that Senate Bill No. 201 was approved finally byl 
unanimous voice vote of all senators present and with one senator ab-
sent. It does not separately list the individual senators voting "yea." 
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It only presumes everyone voted yea when collectively the body of 
senators responded yea. It is conceivable that some senators either 
through inattention or indifference did not vote at all, even though 
present at the time. No provision is made for abstention votes. In 
holding that a constitutional provision requiring "assent" for passage re-
quired an affirmative act, the Missouri Supreme Court in 1878 stated that 
one staying away from the polls on voting day does not express an agree-
ment of his mind to a proper vote upon or simply manifest thereby an 
indifference on the subject. Words and Phrases, 1Yea'Vol. 46 (1970). at 
page 519, citing The State ex rel Woodson v. Brassfield, 67 Mo. 331, 335 
(1878). 
Taking a yea and nay vote contemplates a roll call vote where-
upon each individual responds, and his vote is recorded separately with 
his name in the Journal. Black's Law Dictionary, (Revised 4th Ed. P. 1791), 
defines the phrase "the yeas and nays" as "calling for the individual 
and oral vote of each member, usually upon a call of the roll." (Emphasis 
supplied.) Robert's Rules of Order, Section 44, contains the following 
entry on p. 353: 
"ROLL CALL VOTE. Taking a vote by roll call (or by 
yeas and nays, as it is also called} •.•• " (Their 
emphasis.) 
Robert's RulES of Order further discusses other voting procedures which are 
clearly separate and distinct from a yea-nay; i.e., roll call, vote; 
for examp 1 e, illustrates how standing votes, voice votes, etc •• 
are taken and these differ markedly in fonn from roll call votes. 
-5-
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The cases on the issue are in accord with the above author-
ities. Lincoln v. Haugen, 48 N.W. 196 (Minn. 1891), sustained the 
validity of Chapter 129. Gen. Laws 1885, Minnesota.against an attack 
based on the theory that the Legislature had not complied with a. con-
stitutional provision mandating yea-nay votes. Since the constitutional 
provision did not govern the bill before the Court. the Court's pronounce. 
ment is dicta. Nevertheless, the Court at p. 196, in discussing alterna- 1 
tive voting procedures, stated that a yea-nay vote is synonymous with a j 
ro 11 ca 11 vote. 
"Apart from such constitutional prov1s1ons, the 
ordinary method of taking a vote upon a question 
is by the voices, show of hands, or by a rising 
vote, affirmative or negative. It may also be 
done by a roll-call. But where the object is to as-
certain the names as well as the number voting on 
each side, with a view to have them entered on the journal, this method, when resorted to, to obtain such 
lists of names, is denominated, 'taking the yeas and 
nays on a question.'" 
' 
In To Certain Members of the House of Representatives in the 
General Assembly, 191 A. 269 (R. I. 1937), the Rhode Island Supreme Court 
declined to render an advisory opinion as certain procedural requirements 
necessary to authorize it to render an opinion were not satisfied. It 
appears that these requirements were not met because the presiding of- I 
ficer in the House would not permit roll call votes to be taken. In ex· 
plaining its refusal to opine, the Court, at p. 27, had occasion to ex· 
plain its understanding of what a yea-nay vote required: 
" ••• In this connection it is pertinent to point 
out the provisions of section 8 of article 4 of our 
Constitution, which provides: 'Each house shall keep I 
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a journal of its proceedings. The yeas and nays of the 
members of either house shall, at the desire of one-
fifth of those present, be entered on the journal.' 
This mandatory provision of the Constitution requires a 
roll call, and a recording of the vote of the members of 
the House, when proper and timely request is made therefor. 
It is right that neither the House nor any member thereof, 
whatever position he may occupy in its organization, may disre-
gard or willfully nullify.It 
In People v. Chicago & E.I. Ry. Co., 145 N.E. 716 (Ill. 1924), 
the Illinois Supreme Court invalidated a county tax not levied upon an 
aye and nay vote. The evidence showerl that the 
" •.. resolutions in the matter of the levy of tax 
were adopted by a viva voce vote; that there was no 
roll call; that those who were in favor of adopting 
the resolutions voted by simply saying 'aye,' and 
those opposed voted collectively by saying 'no. 111 
On the issue of whether this procedure complied with the requirement for 
an aye-nay vote, the Court held that this 
(The procedure) 
11 
••• does not show an aye and nay vote, or a roll 
call, which is necessary to such a vote •••• It shows 
the taking of a viva voce vote, and that the resolu-
tion was carried by such vote. It does not show any com-
pliance or attempt at compliance with the requirement 
of the statute that there shall be an aye and nay vote 
and the entry of such vote on the record." (p. 717) 
The procedure followed in People v. Chicago & E.I. Ry. Co. supra, 
is basically identical with the procedure utilized in adopting Senate Bill 
201. In light of the preceding authorities, it seems fairly certain that, 
if the Utah courts were to follow the existing doctrine, they would be 
compelled to hold the Legislature did not take the roll call vote re-
quired by Article VI, Section 22, even though the journals would show the 
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result of the voice vote. 
It is also well settled that provisions in state Consti-
tutions requiring final votes to be upon yeas and nays are mandatory, 
not permissive. Article I, Section 26, Utah Constitution. People 
v. Chicago & E.I. Ry. Co., supra; State ex rel. General Motors Coi:.E_., 
A.C. Electronics Division v. City of Oak Creek, 182 N.W. 2d 481, 492 
(Wisc. 1971). Therefore, the Legislature's failure to comply with 
the mandate of Article VI, Section 22, should result in a declaration 
that the law was not validly enacted. Such was the result in State 
ex rel. General Motors Corp., A.C. Electronics Division v. City of Oak 
Creek, supra. There the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld an attack ona 
statute imposing a personal property tax on U.S. Government property in 
General Motors' possession. Despite Article VIII, Section 8 of the Wis· I 
consin Constitution, which requires a vote by yeas and nays where the Le!· 
is 1 ature imposes a tax, the Legislature did not take the necessary vote. 
The Court, at page 492, rejected an attack on the rule therein set fortn 
and held that 
" where a tax is enacted it is mandatory 
that the yeas and nays be recorded in the legis-
lative journals. This defect alone is sufficient 
to render Section 70. ll (BM}, Stats., a nullity." 
' 
Courts will often strain to uphold legislation that does not 
strictly comply with constitutional requirements. While it is submittea I 
that the case law treating the yea-nay vote as mandatory disposes of thi! 
possibility, a court might be.susceptible to a substantial compliance 
-8-
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argument; i.e., one that claimed since the purpose behind the 
constitutional requirement had been met, the law should be de-
clared validly enacted. An example of such a case is Day v. Walker, 
247 N.W. 350 (Neb. 1933). The Nebraska Constitution requires final 
votes to be taken viva voce. The Legislature had installed an 
electronic voting system whereby the vote of each individual mem-
ber appeared next to his name on a tally board mounted in the legis-
lative chamber. The Court sustained the laws enacted while this device 
was in use because it interpreted the viva voce provision as requiring 
only that the votes of each and every legislator be public; that is, 
be open to all to know and see. In effect, the Court went bEU'ond the 
language of the Constitution and sought to insure only that the procedure 
met the spirit, if not the language, of the Constitution. 
Two possible rationales for the yea-nay requirement of Arti-
cle VI, Section 22, are suggested. First, the vote could be required 
for the purpose of creating a public record which details how each mem-
ber of the body voted. The rationale would be that democratic govern-
ment works best only when the people know where their representatives 
stand on given matters. See People v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co., 71 N.E. 
2d 701 (Ill. 1947); Day v. Walker, supra. This is the issue of account-
ability. There is no accountability when Utah senators may quietly ab-
stain from voting, and when the specific vote is not listed next to their 
names in the Journal. 
-9-
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The second rationale, however, is more troublesome to those 
contending for the validity of Senate Bill 201. Cooley, Constitu-
tional Limitations (5th Ed.), at page 169, declares that the yea-nay 
vote requirement 
" is designed to serve an important purpose in 
compelling each member present to assume as well as 
feel his due share of responsibility in legislation... " 
If one considers the yea-nay vote provision as basically a device to 
protect against ill-conceived laws by forcing each legislator to take 
a position on the bill, thereby increasing the likelihood that he will 
study and think about the law, then the procedure utilized to adopt 
Senate Bill 201 does not satisfy the purpose for the provision. Like-
wise, according to the Consent Calendar procedure, the bill may not be 
debated or amended immediately prior to the vote for final passage. 
Accordingly, the substantial compliance argument is not a viable argu-
ment. 
Respondents would urge this Court to follow the enrolled bill 
doctrine apparently first espoused by the Utah Supreme Court in 1896 in 
the case of Richie v. Richards, 14 Utah 345, at page 354, whic;h provides: 
"The statutes in question having been duly 
signed, approved and deposited in the office of the 
secretary of state, we must conclusively presume that 
all constitutional requisites were complied with in 
their enactment .•.. " 
It should be noted, however, that two of the three members of 
the Utah Supreme Court at that time, Justice Bartch and Justice Miner, 
-10-
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concurred in the ultimate holding, denying petitioner's request 
for a Writ of Prohibition, but, however, dissented from Chief 
Justice Zane's opinion and concluded at pages (co1TUTiencing at page 
361 and page 369, respectively}, that the validity of a statute 
when duly enrolled, signed, approved and deposited with the secre-
tary of state is prima facie, but not conclusive evidence of its con-
stitutional enactment and of what the law is. Further, when that 
statute is drawn in question, the Courts who are called upon to deter-
mine its validity may have power to go beyond the enrolled act and 
look into the Journals of the Legislature required to be kept by the 
Constitution to satisfy the judicial mind as to its constitutional 
passage. (At page 362) It should also be noted in Richie v. Richards, 
supra, that the Utah Supreme Court specifically held that the limita-
tions and restrictions contained in Article VI, Section 22 of the Utah 
Constitution, in question herein respecting the enactment of laws, are 
mandatory and binding upon the Legislature. 
Respondents also submit the case of Dean v. Rampton, 538 P.2d 
169 (1975). This case basically stands for the proposition that the Court 
may look to the Journals to uphold the constitutionality of any act. Ap-
pellants take no issue with this case, but note only that the Senate 
Journals do not list the respective yea votes of each senator pertaining 
to Senate Bill 201, but only list that one senator was absent. It is 
submitted that this does not meet the mandatory requirements of the Utah 
Constitution set forth in Article VI, Section 22, on its face. 
-11-
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CONCLUSION 
Constitutional provisions calling for a yea-nay vote are 
satisfied only where a roll call vote is taken. Such provisions are 
mandatory and even if a court were disposed to find such a provision 
satisfied on the basis of substantial compliance, the possible dual 
rationales for the provision are such as to dictate against any find-
ing of substantial compliance here. Accordingly, Senate Bi 11 201 would 
not appear to have been adopted in accordance with the provision of 
Article VI, Section 22 of the Ut~Constitution which mandates that 
upon the final passage of all bil s the vote is to be by yeas and 
nays. R••tt~·b.A#LbV;, 
Dated September 23, 1977. 
M~(EL L. DEAMER 
Deputy Attorney General 
Attorney for Robert B. Hansen, 
Appellant 
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